University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy
Volume 30

Issue 1

Article 3

2019

The Cost of (In)Justice: A Preliminary Study of the Chilling Effect
of the $50 Application Fee in Florida's Misdemeanor Courts
Alisa Smith

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp
Part of the Law and Society Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Smith, Alisa (2019) "The Cost of (In)Justice: A Preliminary Study of the Chilling Effect of the $50
Application Fee in Florida's Misdemeanor Courts," University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy: Vol.
30: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp/vol30/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

THE COST OF (IN)JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF THE
CHILLING EFFECT OF THE $50 APPLICATION FEE IN
FLORIDA'S MISDEMEANOR COURTS
Alisa Smith*
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................

I.
II.

60

GIDEON-TO-FULLER: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE
CHILLING EFFECT OF THE PRICE FOR JUSTICE...........................66
RECOUPMENT AND CONTRIBUTION PROVISIONS
AND THE LIMITED SCHOLARLY RESEARCH ON
A PPLICATION FEES ...................................................................

71

III.

FLORIDA, "CASH REGISTER JUSTICE," AND ITS
ABYSMAL FAILURE IN FUNDING ITS COURTS
AND COLLECTING FEES ............................................................ 73

IV.

EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF THE
$50 APPLICATION FEE .............................................................. 78

A.
B.

C.

V.

Three-Minute Justice ........................................................ 78
Replication in Orange County, Florida........................... 80
1. General Observations ............................................ 82
2. Observational D ata....................................................84
DefendantInterviews........................................................86
1. The Results-Oriented Focus of Defendants .............. 88
2. The Indirect "Chill" of the Application Fee..............89
3. Perceptions of Fairness ............................................. 91

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION.................................................92

Abstract
At least 27 states, including Florida, charge application fees to poor
defendants to determine whether they qualify for the appointment of
counsel.' Whether these fees dissuade poor defendants from asserting
their right to counsel is an empirical question with an empirical answer.
The Supreme Court, however, has treated this question as a matter of
settled fact, determining that added fees do not chill the assertion of the
right to appointed counsel. 2 In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not
* The author would like to thank Samantha Forkel, a University of Central Florida
student, for contributing to this Article by conducting statutory research and defendant interviews.
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JAMES DOWNING, THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, PUBLIC DEFENDER APPLICATION FEES:

2001 UPDATE 2, 4, 8 (2002).

2. See Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 54 (1974).
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rely on empirical studies or research,3 and to date, no empirical research
has directly answered this question. The present research begins to
explore that empirical void. Relying on court observations and interviews
with defendants who entered pleas during their misdemeanor court
arraignments without counsel, this preliminary research found that the
application fee might chill defendants' decisions to request appointed
counsel, at least indirectly, and more empirical research is necessary on
this important constitutional question.
INTRODUCTION

In 2010, Alisa Smith and Sean Maddan collected data for a study of
the misdemeanor courts in Florida.4 Of the many observed injustices, the
most glaring was that poor people were charged a $50 application fee to
determine if they were too poor to hire an attorney and qualify for
representation by a public defender.5 Although the fee applies in felony
and misdemeanor cases alike, proceeding without counsel on felony
charges is rare, and when it does happen, felony court judges take steps
to ensure that defendants waive counsel with knowledge of the
6
disadvantages of proceeding without counsel. On the other hand, selfrepresentation is common-perhaps the norm-in misdemeanor courts,
and despite the Supreme Court holding that defendants are afforded the
7
right to counsel when they are subject to incarceration, most defendants
proceed without counsel, and trial judges rarely take steps to ensure that
defendants understand the gravity of proceeding pro se.
Gideon v. Wainwright 9 guaranteed as a constitutional imperative that
anyone too poor to hire an attorney and charged with a felony was entitled
to representation under the Sixth Amendment, but the Court provided no
guidance on exactly how the states should accomplish representation, no
definition for who qualified as indigent, and no explanation about how

3. See id.
4. ALISA

SMITH &

SEAN MADDAN,

FLORIDA'S MISDEMEANOR COURTS

THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN

14 (2011).

5. Id. at 22.
6. Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees for
Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2045, 2078-79 (2006).

7. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972) (holding defendants had the right to
counsel, but only in cases with the potential for jail); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374
(1979) (clarifying Argersinger by holding that misdemeanor defendants were only entitled to
counsel ifjudges intended to impose a jail term); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 65859 (2002) (holding that misdemeanants' sentenced to a suspended term were entitled to counsel
because upon violation there was the potential for incarceration).
SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 4, at 14.
9. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8.
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public counsel would be funded.1 0 The impact of Gideon was moderated,
however, because many states already provided counsel for poor people
charged with felonies." "[S]tates, counties, and jurisdictions ha[d]
established varying means of providing public representation for
defendants unable to afford a private attorney." 12 Typical models for
representing the poor include some combination of (1) public defender
office; (2) assigned private counsel; and (3) contract system of private
attorneys agreeing to represent indigent defendants. 13 While states
adopted varying approaches to providing counsel for the poor, local
governments and public defender agencies lobbied legislatures for costsharing models to support indigent representation.1 4 The various funding
approaches differed significantly from one another."
In 1972, the Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to
misdemeanor defendants.16 InArgersingerv. Hamlin, 7 and that same day
in James v. Strange,18 the Court struck down the funding model for
indigent representation implemented in Kansas as unconstitutional. 19 The
Kansas recoupment law 20 violated the Equal Protection Clause because
costs were assessed against those convicted and acquitted without
providing any of the protections afforded to civil debtors. 2 1 Although the
Strange Court unanimously invalidated the Kansas recoupment law,
Justice Powell acknowledged that states had legitimate interests in
preserving public funds and passing along those costs to criminal

10. See id.; see also Kate Levine, If You Cannot Afford a Lawyer: Assessing the
Constitutionalityof Massachusetts's Reimbursement Statute, 42 H ARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 191,

192-93 (2007).

11. Erica Hashimoto, The Problem with Misdemeanor Representation,70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1019, 1034-35 (2013) ("At the time the Court decided Gideon, forty-four states already
provided representation to all indigent felony defendants, and only five states limited such
representation to capital cases.") (citing John F. Decker & Thomas J. Lorigan, Comment, Right
to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103,

104, n.13 (1970)).
12.

LYNN LANGTON & DONALD FAROLE, JR., SPECIAL REPORT, STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
2007, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 3 (2010),

PROGRAMS,

https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf.
13. Id. (finding that only one state, Maine, did not have a public defender system when data
was collected in 2007; twenty-two states have a state public defender program and twenty-seven
states have public defender offices administered at the county level).

14. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 133 (1972).
15. See id.
16. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972).
17. Id.

18. 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
19. Id. at 133.
20. See, e.g., id. at 128. These recoupment laws allow for the reimbursement of legal fees
and costs associated with appointed representation.

21. Id. at 134-42.
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defendants. 2 2 He particularly highlighted the potential impact of the
Argersinger decision, which forecasted expanding criminal dockets:
We note here also that the state interests represented by
recoupment laws may prove important ones. Recoupment
proceedings may protect the State from fraudulent
concealment of assets and false assertions of indigency.
Many States, moreover, face expanding criminal dockets,
and this Court has required appointed counsel for indigents
in widening classes of cases and stages of prosecution. Such
trends have heightened the burden on public revenues, and
recoupment laws reflect legislative efforts to recover some
of the added costs. Finally, federal dominance of the Nation's
major revenue sources has encouraged state and local
governments to seek new methods of conserving public
funds, not only through the recoupment of indigents' counsel
fees but of other forms of public assistance as well.
We thus recognize that state recoupment statutes may
betoken legitimate state interests. But these interests are not
thwarted by requiring more even treatment of indigent
criminal defendants with other classes of debtors to whom
the statute itself repeatedly makes reference. State
recoupment laws, notwithstanding the state interests they
may serve, need not blight in such discriminatory fashion the
hopes of indigents for self-sufficiency and self-respect. The
statute before us embodies elements of punitiveness and
discrimination which violate the rights of citizens to equal
treatment under the law. 2 3
Unlike in the aftermath of Gideon, most states did not have systematic
representation in place for misdemeanor offenders at the time the right to
24 And, as Justice
counsel was extended to misdemeanor defendants.
Powell predicted, misdemeanor prosecutions grew to comprise 77.5% of
the total criminal caseload with an estimated 13.2 million cases filed

22. Id. at 141-42.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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annually, 25 and with misdemeanor and ordinance violations comprising a
large share of public defender representation. 26
In James v. Strange, the Court avoided deciding "[w]hether the
statutory obligation for repayment impermissibly deterred the exercise of
[the right to counsel]." 2 7 Two years later, however, in Fullerv. Oregon,28
the Court upheld an Oregon statute which provided criminal defendants
the same rights as other judgment debtors and applied the fees to only
those convicted of crimes, against both Equal Protection and Right to
Counsel challenges. 2 9 The Oregon law, the Court held, was objectively
reasonable. 3 0
Important to this Article,. the Fuller Court held the Oregon
recoupment statute did not infringe on defendants' right to counsel,
rejecting the argument that the repayment of legal costs affected
defendants' ability to obtain legal services, and therefore did not "chill
the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to
exercise them[.]"31 Fuller dealt with a felony offense, and the Court
observed that the Oregon statute "merely provide[d] that a convicted
person who later becomes able to pay for counsel may be required to do
so." 3 2

Whether poor people are dissuaded or chilled from asserting their
right to counsel due to the added costs of applying for counsel or being
held responsible for an unknown amount of representation costs are
empirical questions with empirical answers. Although the Supreme Court
treated the question as settled fact, in determining that these added fees
do not chill the assertion of the right to counsel, the Court did not rely on

25. Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L.
REV. 731, 737 (2018) (providing the most recent estimate of misdemeanor case filings in the
United States); see also ROBERT C. LA-FOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS,
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS (2012)

(estimating ten million misdemeanor case filings in 2010); see also Alexandra Natapoff,
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320 (2012); see also Susan S. Silbey, Making Sense of
the Lower Courts. 6 JUST. SYS. J. 13, 13 (1981); cf Patrick Walker, Felony and Misdemeanor
Defendants filed in the U.S. District Courts During Fiscal Years 1990-95: An Analysis of the
Filings of Each Offense Level, 26(6) J. CRIM. JUST. 503, 504-06 (1998) (noting that the number
of federal misdemeanor filings was strongly dependent on enforcement practices of local
authorities).
26. LANGTON & FAROLE, supra note 12, at 1 ("Misdemeanor and ordinance violations
accounted for the largest share (43%) of cases received by public defender programs.").

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
(1968)).
32.

James, 407 U.S. at 134.
417 U.S. 40 (1974).
See id. at 50, 53-54.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 54 (quoting and distinguishing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S 570, 581
Id. at 54.
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3
empirical studies or research on that question. There has also not been
any research, to date, that has directly examined that question. The
present research begins to explore that empirical void. Despite the Fuller
continue to advance
legal scholars and litigants
holding,
costs impede
contribution
and
recoupment
that
claims
unconstitutionality
court-appointed
obtaining
from
counsel
defendants too poor to hire
assistance and steadfastly contend that recoupment and contribution or
4
copay fees violate the Sixth Amendment and the spirit of Gideon.3 But,
35
they do so with little more than speculation and anecdotes.
Unsurprisingly, anecdotes and logic have been unsuccessful in
convincing the courts that these costs infringe on defendants'
constitutional rights, particularly when these arguments are advanced by
3 6 As Justice
defendants who are actually represented by counsel.
Marshall nofed in his dissenting opinion in Fuller, a challenge to these
laws would be more germane if brought by an individual who had not
exercised their constitutional right due to hardship resulting from the
statutory fee.3 7 To date, all constitutional challenges have been brought
by defendants represented by counsel at trial, which "mak[es] it hard to
38
argue that their right to counsel was actually chilled."
At least 27 states, including Florida, charge upfront registration or
application fees, 39 and these fees are more likely to pose an obstacle or
barrier for misdemeanor defendants, who are poor, charged with "minor"

33. See id.; see also Wright & Logan, supra note 6, at 2047.
34. See Helen A. Anderson, PenalizingPoverty: Making CriminalDefendants Payfor their
Court-Appointed Counsel through Recoupment and Contribution,42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323,
325 (2009); see also Levine, supra note 10, at 192; see also Wright & Logan, supra note 6, at

2047; see also Devon Porter, Payingfor Justice: The Human Cost of Public Defender Fees,
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/liman/document/pdfees2017),
(June
ACLU
report.pdf; see also Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, The Poor are Paying the Price, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-

court-fees-punish-the-poor.
35. Some legal scholars argue that many states' laws do not comply with the circumspection
of Fuller, others continue to argue the laws violate Equal Protection and Due Process, and some
focus on the ethical dilemma facing public counsels' who, in some states, are forced to seek

additional costs against their clients' interests. Here, the focus is on whether these added costs
infringe on the poor's right to counsel.
36. Anderson, supra note 34, at 360.
37. Fuller, 417 U.S. at 61 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Levine, supra note 10, at

207.
38. Levine, supra note 10, at 214-15.

39.

DoWNING,

supra note 1, at 4, 8.
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crimes, and as observed by commentators and researchers, 4 0 regularly
proceed without counsel.4 1
This Article explores whether an empirical basis exists for the
assertion that pre-appointment contribution, co-payment, registration, or
application fees chill misdemeanants' right to counsel contravening the
Sixth Amendment. Part I provides a brief overview of Gideon's promise
of the right to counsel for those who are too poor to hire an attorney and
the right as extended to misdemeanor offenders along with the Supreme
Court's decisions that allow the state to assess representation costs to
those appointed public counsel. Part II summarizes the national scope of
recoupment and contribution provisions and reviews the limited scholarly
research that contends that these laws violate the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel. Part III focuses on Florida's recoupment and application fee
laws that, scholars have noted, are some of the most stringent in the
nation. Florida imposes both an application (or copayment) fee as well as
recoupment or reimbursement costs, and it is the only state that prohibits
judicial waiver of these imposed fees.4 2 Part IV explains the methodology
and results of the current study, including a brief overview of the findings
reported in Three-Minute Justice,4 3 highlighting the findings from
Orange County, Florida in 2010, and comparing those findings to a semireplication of that study with information gathered in Orange County in
summer 2018.
To specifically address whether Florida's $50 application fee impedes
or chills the assertion of the right to counsel, 14 misdemeanor defendants
who waived counsel and entered a plea were interviewed after their court
hearings and asked, among other questions: (1) whether they understood
that they had the right to counsel; (2) whether they were informed that
there was a $50 application fee; and (3) why they waived their right to
counsel. Part V discusses the findings and draws conclusions about the
potential of (1) the impact of pre-appointment application fees on
misdemeanor defendants' waiver of counsel; and (2) the need for more
research to assess whether the failure of trial judges to adequately advise
defendants on the disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, the
40. See Hashimoto, supra note 11, at 488; Jenny M. Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter:
Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 277, 277
(2011); STEPHEN F. HANLON ET AL., Denial of the Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases: Court
Watching in Nashville, Tennessee, Washington DC: American Bar Association, 8-9 (2017);
Thomas B. Harvey et al., Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor ProsecutionsAfter Alabama v.
Shelton: No-Lawyer-Courts and Their Consequences on the Poor and Communities of Color in
St. Louis, 29 CRIM. J. POL'Y REV. 688, 697 (2018).
41. See Porter, supra note 34, at 1; see also Shapiro, supra note 34.
42. See Fla. Stat. § 27.52(1)(b)-(c) (2018). Minnesota imposed a mandatory, non-waivable
application fee, but shortly after its adoption, the Minnesota Supreme Court struck the provision
as unconstitutional. State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403, 410-11 (Minn. 2004).
43. SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 4.
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potential consequences of entering a plea beyond the imposed fine, and
the imposed application fees and other costs that chill defendants' from
asserting their right to counsel, or at least affect their perception about
whether they need a lawyer for a misdemeanor charge.
I. GIDEON-TO-FULLER: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE CHILLING
EFFECT OF THE PRICE FOR JUSTICE

In 1963, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel was fundamental, and Clarence Gideon, who was prosecuted in
Florida for committing felony burglary, was unconstitutionally denied
counsel.44 In sweeping language, the Court recognized that "in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any-person haled into court, who is
too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him."4 5 The Court did not, however, extend that right to
misdemeanor cases for nearly ten more years, and even then, the right
was not universally applied to all misdemeanants.46
In another Florida case, Jon Argersinger, who was convicted of
misdemeanor possession of a concealed weapon, was denied counsel and
sentenced to 90 days in jail.4 7 The Supreme Court once aain held that
The Court
the denial of counsel violated the Sixth Amendment.
extended the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases, but only for those
49
that resulted in actual incarceration. By broadening the scope of the
Sixth Amendment, the Court placed greater burdens on states to provide
some misdemeanants counsel. This burden was compounded thirty years
later in Alabama v. Shelton,50 when the Supreme Court held that
misdemeanor defendants who were subject to potential incarceration
were entitled to counsel as well, "a suspended sentence that may 'end up
in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty' may not be imposed unless
the defendant was accorded 'the guiding hand of counsel' in the
prosecution for the crime charged." 5 1 Despite the expansion of the right
to counsel in misdemeanor cases, legal scholars continue to observe that
significant numbers of constitutionally-entitled misdemeanor defendants
remain unrepresented. 52 Some argue that it has been the passing along of

44. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
45. Id.
46. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36-37.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 37-38.
Id. at 40.
535 U.S. 654 (2002).
Id. at 658.

52. Hashimoto, supra note 11, at 1026, 1031.
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the costs associated with appointed counsel that has impeded or created
barriers to defendants asserting that right.5 3
The Supreme Court has decided two cases on the constitutionality of
recoupment statutes-those statutes that require defendants to reimburse
the government for court-appointed counsel-but it has not addressed the
constitutionality of application or pre-appointment fees. In James v.
Strange, decided the same day as Argersinger, the Court avoided
addressing the Sixth Amendment challenge, striking down as
unconstitutional the Kansas recoupment law on Equal Protection grounds
because it did not provide criminal debtors the same protection as civil
debtors. 54 Despite the unconstitutionality holding, the Court signaled that
recoupment provisions serve legitimate state interests:
We note here also that the state interests represented by
recoupment laws may prove important ones. Recoupment
proceedings may protect the State from fraudulent
concealment of assets and false assertions of indigency.
Many States, moreover, face expanding criminal dockets,
and this Court has required appointed counsel for indigents
in widening classes of cases and stages of prosecution. Such
trends have heightened the burden on public revenues, and
recoupment laws reflect legislative efforts to recover some
of the added costs.5 5
State interests in recouping costs associated with indigent defense
were particularly important in the face of "expanding criminal dockets."5 6
The Court's observation was prescient.5 7
Misdemeanor prosecutions doubled between 1972 and 2006, while
felony prosecutions waned. 58 Far more defendants are prosecuted in
misdemeanor than felony courts. 59 A 2016 study of fourteen state courts
estimated that misdemeanors comprised 75% of the total criminal

53. See Hashimoto, supra note 11, at 1032; Anderson, supra note 34, at 325.

54. James, 407 U.S. at 139, 141-42.
55. Id. at 141.

'

56. Id.
57. Id
58. Carla J. Barrett, Adjudicating "Broken Windows": A Qualitative Inquiry of
Misdemeanor Case Processing in New York City's Lower Criminal Courts, 18 CRIMINOLOGY,
CRIM. JUST., L. & Soc'Y 62, 63 (2017); see also Roberts, supra note 40, at 327; see generally
ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, Minor Crimes,
Massive Waste: The Terrible Toll of America's Broken Misdemeanor Courts (2009); see
generallyISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, Misdemeanorland: Criminal Courts and Social Control in an
Age of Broken Windows Policing (2018). Recent research, however, has estimated that although
misdemeanors outpace felonies three-to-one, the trend in arrests and cases filed has declined over
the last twenty years. Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 25, at 737.
59. Walker, supra note 25, at 504-05..
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caseload. 60 When the Court decided Argersinger and extended counsel to
misdemeanor prosecutions, few states were providing indigents with
appointed counsel. 6 1 Justice Powell, concurring in Argersinger,raised the
concern that the burden of requiring appointed counsel might actually
2
impede "[t]he ability of various States and localities to furnish counsel."
Although the Court in James v. Strange avoided the Sixth Amendment
right-to-counsel challenge to recoupment statutes, several state courts
directly addressed that argument. 63 The California Supreme Court, in In
re Allen, held its reimbursement statute violated the right to counsel:
[W]e believe that, as knowledge of [the recoupment]
practice has grown and continues to grow, many indigent
defendants will come to realize that the judge's offer to
supply counsel is not the gratuitous offer of assistance that it
might appear to be; that, in the event the case results in a
grant of probation, one of the conditions might well be the
reimbursement of the county for the expense involved. This
knowledge is quite likely to deter or discourage many
defendants from accepting the offer of counsel despite the
gravity of the need for such representation as emphasized by
the [Supreme] [C]ourt in Gideon. . . .6
Taking another approach, the New Hampshire Supreme Court advised
its legislature that a recoupment statute would be unconstitutional under
6
the state's constitutional right to counsel provision. 1 And the American
Bar Association noted in 1968 that "reimbursement for counsel 'should
not be required' because 'the practice raises serious questions,' including
whether waiver of counsel is valid if it is made because of the accused's
unwillingness to undertake such an obligation."66
In addition to rejecting due process and equal protection challenges to
the Oregon recoupment law, the Supreme Court, in Fuller v. Oregon,
rejected the view articulated by the California Supreme Court in In re
Allen that "a defendant's knowledge that he may remain under an
obligation to repay the expenses incurred in providing him legal
60. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 15; see also Natapoff, supra note 25, at 1320; see
also Walker, supra note 25, at 504-05 (noting that the number of federal misdemeanor filings was
strongly dependent on enforcement practices of local authorities); see also Silbey, supra note 25,

at 13.
61. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 59 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Many have concluded that
the indigent's right to appointed counsel does not extend to all misdemeanor cases.").

62. Id.
63. See James, 407 U.S. at 134. But see, e.g., In re Allen, 455 P.2d 143, 144 (Cal. 1969).
64. 455 P.2d at 144.
65. Levine, supra note 10, at 203-04 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 256 A.2d 500, 500
(N.H. 1969)).
66. American Bar Ass'n Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Providing Defense

Services 58-59 (Approved Draft 1968).
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representation might impel him to decline the services of an appointed
attorney, and thus 'chill' his constitutional right to counsel." 67 The
Supreme Court found the "reasoning [of the California Court was] wide
of the constitutional mark." 6 8 Rather than focusing on the potential
impediment of the costs, the Court focused on eligibility: "[A]n indigent
who accepts state-appointed legal representation [and] knows that he
might someday be required to repay the costs of these services in no way
affects his eligibility to obtain counsel." 69 In arriving at this conclusion,
the Court relied on a nuanced and presumed understanding of the impact
of recoupment fees on defendants' decision-making, noting that
"Oregon's recoupment statute merely provides that a convicted person
who later becomes able to pay for his counsel may be required to do so." 70
Relying on no empirical data, research, or actual facts, the Court
distinguished cases where it had invalidated laws that "placed a penalty
on the exercise of a constitutional right" because that was the only
purpose of those laws to "chill the assertion of constitutional rights by
penalizing those who choose to exercise them." 7
Several states have likewise upheld imposed reimbursement fees, 72
and in one instance a co-payment fee, on poor defendants to survive a_
chilling-effect challenge. 7 For these courts, the. crafted statutes imposed
fees on defendants who might be able to pay for some of their
representation at the close of the case or later, and therefore did not chill
defendants' ability to obtain appointed counsel. 74 Particularly relevant
here, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld a $28 co-payment fee as not
chilling the right to counsel as long as the co-payment was deducted from
the later-imposed legal representation costs and provided for judicial
waiver of the fee. 75 The discretion to waive the requirement and the
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Fuller, 417 U.S. at 51.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 54.

72. Levine, supra note 10, at 214 ("Between 1974, when Fuller was decided, and 2005
appellate courts in Alaska, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and West Virginia have entertained
and dismissed challenges to their reimbursement statutes."); see also Gerald A. Bos & Eugene B.
Livaudais, ConstitutionalLaw-Recoupment Statutes-Reimbursementof Indigent Defense Costs
Upheld, 49 TuL. L. REV. 699, 702-03 (1975) (providing a review of the recoupment statutes
upheld by state and Supreme Court decisions).
73. See Donovan v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 581, 585 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); see also

State v. Webb, 591 S.E.2d 505, 513 (N.C. 2003) (holding that the appointment fee imposed after
conviction was constitutional and did not have a chilling effect on a defendant's constitutional
right to counsel and notice); see also State v. Cunningham, 663 N.W.2d 7, 10-11 (Minn. Ct. App.

2003).
74. See Donovan, 60 S.W.3d at 581; see Cunningham, 663 N.W.2d at 10-11.
75. Cunningham, 663 N.W.2d at 10-11.
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narrow construction of the statute was consistent, the court concluded,
with Fuller and the Sixth Amendment. 76 As long as the fee was not
enforced against an indigent for whom it would result in manifest
77
hardship, it survived a Sixth Amendment challenge.
In 2003, the Minnesota legislature amended its co-payment statute,
making the payment of a $50 co-payment for public defender assistance
78
an obligation that was not waivable by the trial judge. A constitutional
challenge was leveled against the amended statute, in State v. Tennin, on
the ground that "the statute violated [Tennin's] right to counsel under the
79
Minnesota and United States Constitutions." Tennin was charged with
misdemeanor prostitution, and she indicated that her income was limited
to $250 per month in public assistance. 80 Upon learning of the copayment fee, she initially declined representation, but later she
determined that she needed counsel and paid the $50 fee.81 Applying the
Minnesota Court of Appeals' reasoning in Cunningham, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held its mandated co-payment statute unconstitutional
because, without the waiver protection, the co-payment subjected poor
defendants to manifest hardships and violated the right to counsel under
82
the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.
None of the challenging litigants were unrepresented at trial, including
Tennin. 83 No challenge to the constitutionality of the cost-sharing statutes
has relied on empirical data to determine the effect, if any, of the imposed
fees on waivers of counsel. 84 Scholars continue to argue that "[t]he
broadest challenge" to these laws is to assert that these fees and costs chill
85
poor defendants from exercising the right to counsel, and as Helen
Anderson remarked, "[t]he fact that the Fuller Court found no
unconstitutional chill from the narrowly tailored Oregon statute at issue
in that case does not mean that no recoupment [or contribution] statute
will cause an unconstitutional chill." 86 Whether these laws pose a

76. Id. at 11.
77. Id. at 12.

78. State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403, 405-06 (Minn. 2004) ("The 2003 amended version
of section 611.17, subdivision 1(c), instituted three significant changes: (1) the statute created a
co-payment obligation upon appointment of the public defender rather than at disposition of the

case; (2) it deleted the express language establishing a judicial waiver of the co-payment; and (3)
it increased the amount of the co-payment.").

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 405.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 405, 410-11.

83. See Tennin, 674 N.W.2d at 405; see Fuller, 417 U.S. at 40; see James, 407 U.S. at 129;
see In re Allen, 455 P.2d at 143.

84. Anderson, supra note 34, at 360.
85. Levine, supra note 10, at 213.
86. Anderson, supra note 34, at 360.
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"chilling" effect is an empirical question deserving of an empirical
answer.
II. RECOUPMENT AND CONTRIBUTION PROVISIONS AND THE LIMITED
SCHOLARLY RESEARCH ON APPLICATIONS FEES

Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Gideon, states
and the federal government adopted recoupment statutes, and within 10
years of that decision, 17 states had implemented statutes to recover legal
costs associated with indigent defense. 87 Today, every jurisdiction in the
United States has either a statutory or judicially approved mechanism for
contribution to or repayment of public counsel costs by defendants. 88
These "statutory recovery system[s] [are] designed to recoup all or some
of the costs associated with the government's constitutional obligation to
provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants." 89
Litigation and scholarship have focused on the constitutionality and
effect of recoupment or reimbursement laws with a range of challenges
on equal protection, due process, and defenders' conflict of interest
grounds. 9 0 The use of contribution, copayment, or application fees,
particularly concerning misdemeanor defendants, and the potential for
violating the Sixth Amendment has garnered far less attention.91
Without a national repository that gathers data on misdemeanor
arrests, prosecutions, convictions, sentencing, and the appointment of
counsel, little empirical research is available to examine these important
questions. 92 "[Researchers] are left with the strategy of sampling court
data from state systems" and waiver rates "look[] different from state to
state, and different from one year to the next." 93 Most of the discussion
87. Bos & Livaudais, supra note 72, at 700.

88. Beth A. Colgan, Paying for Gideon, 99

IowA L. REV. 1929, 1931 n.4 (2014) (citing

Richard J. Wilson, Compelling Indigent Defendants to Pay the Cost of Counsel Adds Up to Bad
Policy, Bad Law, 3 CRIM. JUST. 16, 16 (Fall 1988)); see also Wayne D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth
Amendment for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: Do Reimbursement Statutes Support
Recognition ofa Right to Counsel ofChoicefor the Indigent?,64 BROOK. L. REV. 181, 218 (1998);
see also Levine, supra note 10, at 193.
89. Holly, supra note 88, at 218 (citing generally Francis M. Dougherty, Validity,
Construction and Application of State Recoupment Statutes PermittingState to Recover Counsel
Fees Expendedfor Benefit of Indigent CriminalDefendants, 39 A.L.R. 4th 597 (1985)).
90. Failing to pay the debts associated with criminal justice fines, courts costs, and fees may
result in incarceration, and in 2015, "at least ten lawsuits were filed against municipalities for
incarcerating individuals in modern-day debtors' prisons." Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor:
CriminalJustice Debt & Modern-DayDebtors' Prisons, 75 MD. L: REv. 486, 486 (2016).
91. Wright & Logan, supra note 6, at 2078 ("The application fee debate, however, has
lacked any analogous empirical evidence. This dearth of consumer-level data is part of a larger
knowledge gap about the waiver of counsel more generally."); see also Anderson, supra note 34,
at 360.
92. Wright & Logan, supra note 6, at 2080; Hashimoto, supra note 11, at 1025.
93. Wright & Logan, supra note 6, at 2080.
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about chilling effects is speculative, based on anecdotal evidence about
the likely behavior of rational actors. There is a dearth of empirical
evidence about the actual effects of different recoupment and
contribution schemes on waiver rates." 94
Research by Ronald Wright and Wayne Logan 'provides the only
95
research, to date, that concentrated on the effect of application fees.
Wright and Logan examined trends in the misdemeanor waiver rates after
the implementation of the application fee in Minnesota and North
Carolina. 96 They found that there was not a significant increase in the
waiver rate in either state. 9 7 Wright and Logan determined that "[t]he
arrival of the new application fee statutes in [North Carolina and
Minnesota] did not profoundly shift the waiver rates as reflected in these
aggregate court statistics." 9 8 These results were not as expected. Wright
and Logan noted that trial court actors anticipated that the additional fee
would significantly increase waivers of counsel and other studies showed
that consumer behaviors were negatively influenced by co-payments in
other settings, like medical appointments.9 9
In understanding these incongruent findings, Wright and Logan
discounted the explanation that public defense organization
administrators, who supported these fees, were correct when they
suggested that the fees would not be large enough to affect waiver
decisions.1 00 Rather, they thought the results were more likely reflective
of "the power of trial actors to blunt the effects of any new criminal
justice policy, at least in the short run." 10 1 Trial judges might be
"generous in granting waivers," or judges and defense attorneys can
downplay the importance of the fee, which would result in fewer
waivers. 0 2 No matter the reason for the findings, Wright and Logan
recognized that "the court data [was] not well suited to answer the
important questions about waiver."1 0 3 Rather "[t]he people who matter
most here-the defendants-cannot be heard through aggregate statistics
about case processing."1 04 Wright and Logan advocated for "track[ing]
waiver decisions of individual defendants," including their reasons for
05
choosing the appointment of public counsel, or waiving that right.1
94. Anderson, supra note 34, at 360.
95. Anderson, supra note 34, at 360.
96. Anderson, supra note 34, at 360.

97. Wright & Logan, supra note 6, at 2080-82.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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105. Wright & Logan, supra note 6, at 2086.
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Their "preliminary survey of aggregate court statistics points to a need
for different measurement techniques: the gathering of case-level
information that captures local courtroom variety and the reasoning of
individual defendants." 106 Whether application fees chill the right to
counsel remains an open empirical question.
III. FLORIDA, "CASH REGISTER JUSTICE,"1 07 AND ITS "ABYSMAL
FAILURE" IN FUNDING ITS COURTS AND COLLECTING FEES' 0 8

In an article published in 1996, Judge Scott J. Silverman summarized
the history of and critiqued Florida's law on imposing and recouping
attorney's fees from publicly represented criminal defendants.1 09 In 1989,
the Florida Supreme Court, in Bull v. State,1 10 upheld Florida's
recoupment statute, which advised defendants that they may be required
to repay the costs of appointed counsel or if insolvent, repay those costs
later when they are financially able.' Florida's recoupment law was
originally enacted in 1963, the same year that Gideon v. Wainwright' 2
was decided, and it was intended to allow the State of Florida to impose
a lien on defendants' properties for those convicted, as well as
acquitted.1 1 3 In 1977, the Legislature substantially rewrote the law to
apply only to defendants found guilty, and the imposed lien was to be
recorded in the county's, not the State's, favor at sentencing as a statutory
lien." 4 The law also provided defendants with the right to notice and
hearing on the amount of the repayment lien." 5
At the time that Judge Silverman wrote the article, the lien and
assessment of costs was not mandatory, but discretionary, and it was the
duty of the assigned public defender to request the imposed fees."1 6 The
practice, however, was that public defenders were not "uniformly
106. Wright & Logan, supra note 6, at 2087.
107. REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FLORIDA'S

JUSTICE FEES 1 (2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/
Justice/FloridaF&F.pdf?nocdn=l (providing a comprehensive review of Florida's reliance on
imposing fees and fines on criminal defendants, the burdens of those costs without examining the
associated consequences, and recommendations to repair Florida's broken system).
108. Scott J. Silverman, Imposing and RecoupingAttorneys' Feesfrom Publicly Represented
Criminal Defendants, 70 FLA. B.J. 18, 26 (1996) (concluding that "[i]n practice and with few
exceptions, Florida's recoupment statute is an abysmal failure."); see also James, 407 U.S. at 133
(observing that in the two years the Kansas law was in effect, it collected only $17,000, but cost
CRIMINAL

the state $400,000).
109. Silverman, supra note 108, at 18.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

548 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1989).
Id. at 1105; Silverman, supra note 108, at 20.
See 372 U.S. at 335.
Silverman, supra note 108, at 20.
Silverman, supra note 108, at 20.
Silverman, supra note 108, at 20.

116. Silverman, supra note 108, at 24.
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comply[ing] with the statute." 1 7 Judge Silverman suggested the
"legislature might consider either amending or abolishing the law, since
18
statewide compliance is infrequent and unpredictable."' Particularly, he
asserted that the Legislature should adopt "a fee or lien schedule [that]
could streamline the statute, reduce the necessary paperwork, promote
uniform statewide compliance, fund additional public defenders, and
1 19
preserve scarce judicial and public defender resources."
Whether Judge Silverman's article was the impetus for the change in
Florida law is unknown, but in 1996, the Florida Legislature "added more
than 20 new categories of financial obligations for criminal defendants
and, at the same time, eliminated most exemptions for those who cannot
pay."1 2 0 Florida's criminal justice system relies on these imposed fees and
costs to operate the court system, and these new fees and costs were
adopted without examining whether cumulative debt promotes
recidivism and hinders reentry.1 2 1
As part of the larger move to burden criminal defendants with fees
and costs,1 2 2 the Legislature adopted an application fee, which initially
required that a $40 fee be paid into the county repository at the time the
affidavit of indigency was filed.'1 2 Originally, the law allowed for judicial
waiver of the fee, i.e., the trial judge could review "the financial
information contained in the affidavit, [and determine] that the fee should
24
In 1997, the Florida
be reduced, waived, or assessed at the disposition."
Legislature directed the clerks of court to transfer the collected
application fees to the Indigent Criminal Defense Trust Fund, but
125
The
permitted the clerk to retain a percentage for administrative costs.
application
Legislature also amended Florida Statute § 27.56 to allow the
fee to be included in the judgment assessed against defendants following
conviction1 2 6 and amended Florida Statute § 948.03 (1997) to provide
that payment of the indigency application fee to be made a condition of
probation or community control. 7
117. Silverman, supra note 108, at 24.
118. Silverman, supra note 108, at 26.
119. Silverman, supra note 108, at 27.
120.

DILLER,

supra note 107, at 1.

121. DILLER, supra note 107, at 1. Although beyond the scope of this Article, legal scholars
have identified collateral consequences associated with recoupment and contribution fees
(Colgan, supra note 88, at 1930) and a link to the cycle of poverty and incarceration; see, e.g.,
Christopher Hampson, State Bans on Debtors' Prisonsand CriminalJustice Debt, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1024, 1025 (2016); see Sobol, supra note 90, at 516.
122. DILLER, supra note 107, at 5-6 (providing a comprehensive chart of year-to-year

"[I]egislative [a]ction [e]xpanding [c]ourt-[r]elated [d]ebt" from 1997 to 2009, in Florida).
123. 96-232 Fla. Laws 865.
124. Id.
125. 97-107 Fla. Laws 5.
126. See id. at 8.
127. Id. at 11.
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In 2003, the Legislature amended the provisions so that the clerk of
the circuit court, not trial judges, determined indigence.1 2 8 In 2004, the
Legislature revised the law to allow the clerks of court to contract with
third parties to make assessments about indigency using a form created
by the Florida Supreme Court and allowing defendants to seek review of
the clerks' decisions to the court having jurisdiction over their criminal
cases. 12 9 In the first instance, however, it was the clerk who assessed
indigency, providing assistance to those who are unable to complete the
affidavit. Indigency, in 2004, meant individuals' earnings were equal to
or 200% below the federal poverty level based on the number of
individuals in the defendants' households.1 3 0 The legislature limited the
"determination of indigence [to] a ministerial act of the clerk and not a
decision based on further investigation or the exercise of independent
judgment by the clerk."' 3 1
It was in 2004 that the Legislature removed the authority for judicial
waiver, mandating payment of the fee along with the filing of the
financial affidavit, or within seven days after filing.1 3 2 Florida stands in
stark contrast to the other forty-nine states as the only state that does not
authorize trial judges to waive or reduce the fee.1 3 3 That same year, the
law required clerks of court to notify sentencing judges of non-payment,
and further required judges to assess the unpaid application fee as part of
the sentence or as a condition of probation or judgment.1 34 The statute
was amended in 2005 to ensure that non-paying indigent defendants were
not refused counsel or other required due process services, and limited
the administrative fee retained by the clerk to two percent. 135 The
Legislature instituted a "presumption that [individuals are] not indigent
if [they] own[], or [have] equity in, any intangible or tangible personal
property or real property or the expectancy of an interest in any such
property having a net equity value of $2,500 or more, excluding the value
of the person's homestead and one vehicle having a net value not

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

2003-402 Fla. Laws 17.
2004-265 Fla. Laws 14.
Id at 15.
Id. at 14-15.
Id.

133. Wright & Logan, supra note 6, at 2053.

134. 2004-265 Fla. Laws 15.
135. 2005-236 Fla. Laws 11.
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exceeding $5,000."136 In 2008, the Legislature raised the application fee
to $50.137
Again burdening the clerks, the Florida Legislature in 2010 obligated
them to conduct record reviews of property and motor vehicle ownership
to evaluate indigence claims, and that legal representation costs must be
determined and paid within ninety days after disposition of the case,
notwithstanding any appeals.1 3 8 Two years later, the Legislature removed
this obligation making the review of property and motor vehicle records
permissive, so clerks "may" conduct these reviews, but they were not
required to do so. 139 No further changes have been made to the statutes.
Florida still mandates the payment of a $50 non-waivable application fee
to determine whether defendants are poor enough for the appointment of
the public defender, whose services carry a minimum and mandated fee
of $50 in misdemeanor cases. 140
No Florida appellate court has struck down as unconstitutional the
application fees or the legal representation costs as violating the Sixth
Amendment.141 More pointedly, no court has even discussed the
constitutionality of the imposed fees as infringing upon or chilling the
assertion of the right to counsel.1 4 2 Several Florida appellate courts have
reversed the imposed minimum public defender costs when defendants
were not given notice or an opportunity to contest the amount of the
lien. 14 3 Others have steadfastly held that the statutory minimum fees,

136. Id.; see John P. Gross, Too Poor to Hire a Lawyer but Not Indigent: How States Use
the Federal Poverty Guidelines to Deprive Defendants of their Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel,

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173, 1175 (2013) (surveying and critiquing existing eligibility criteria
for the appointment of counsel by particularly arguing that the use of the federal poverty standards
are an unreliable and inappropriate standard for determining indigency).

137. 2008-111 Fla. Laws 5.
138. 2010-162 Fla. Laws 9, 12.
139. 2012-100 Fla. Laws 3; 2012-123 Fla. Laws 4.
140. FLA. STAT. § 27.52(1)(b) (2018).
141. Anderson, supra note 34, at 333 n.48 (opining Florida's law that imposes the $50

application fee without allowing judicial waiver is likely unconstitutional); Hanson v. Passer, 13
F.3d 275, 282 (8th Cir. 1994) (granting habeas relief when partially indigent defendant denied
counsel for failure to first pay $1,000).

142. Contribution fees may also lead to conflicts of interest when administered by public
defender agencies. See Anderson, supra note 34, at 369. Since these are legislated and mandatory
fees, public defenders in Florida do not face this particular conflict of interest. In cases where
defenders are requesting costs above the statutory minimum, however, the conflict of interest is
poignant.

143. See, e.g., Chestnut v. State, 145 So. 3d 193, 194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (remanding
with directions either to strike the $100 indigent legal assistance lien imposed pursuant to section
938.29, Fla. Stat. (2009) or give the defendant the opportunity to contest); see, e.g., Youman v.

State, 112 So. 3d 693, 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (striking a $100 indigent legal assistance
lien imposed under section 938.29(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008) without informing the defendant of his
right to contest the amount of the lien); see, e.g., G.D. v. State, 42 So. 3d 327, 327-28 (Fla. Dist.
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including the $50 application fee, are mandatory, providing for no trial
court discretion and therefore notice and opportunity to contest the
imposed amounts is not necessary.144 The First District, in an en banc
decision, receded from its own precedent that required notice and hearing
to contest the mandatory public defender fees.1 4 5 Holding that the public
defender lien and the $50 application fee are minimum requirements
imposed by statute, the Mills court concluded that the amount is "binding
on the court and the defendant alike" and "no hearing is necessary or
appropriate." 14 6 The minimum fee of $100 applies to persons convicted
of felonies, and $50 for those convicted of misdemeanors. 14 7 The Mills
court observed that the minimum fee and the defendant's liability "for
payment of the assessed application fee under [section] 27.52" are
mandatory.1 4 8 "The Legislature requires that this $50 application fee be
assessed as part of the sentence pursuant to Section 983.29, if not paid
prior to disposition of the case." 14 9
Unlike felony defendants, constitutionally-entitled misdemeanor
defendants frequently waive their right to counsel and proceed pro se.15 0
"The only available nationwide data on representation rates in
misdemeanor cases come from a Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) survey
of inmates confined in local jails." 5 ' This study revealed that 30% of
jailed misdemeanor defendants,
i.e.,
defendants
who
were
constitutionally-entitled to counsel, reported that they were not

Ct. App. 2010) (reversing the public defender's fee imposed pursuant to

§ 938.29, Florida Statutes

(2008) because the statute required notice and an opportunity to object to the mandatory fee).

144. Dabel v. State, 79 So. 3d 873, 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that because the
public defender application fee is "clearly mandatory and not within the trial court's discretion,
no notice was necessary; the statute itself provides notice that any applicant for court-appointed
counsel is required to pay $50"); see also State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139, 142 (Fla. 1991)
(reasoning that a defendant receives constructive notice of the imposition of statutorily mandated
fees by virtue of their being published in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes).
145. All judges on the First District participated in the hearing, and in this instance the
decision was nearly unanimous with only a single judge concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Mills v. State, 177 So. 3d 984, 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
146. Id. at 987.
147. Id. at 986.
148. Id. at 988.
149. Id. (citing §§ 938.29(l)(a); 27.52 (1)(b),.Fla. Stat. (2018)); see also Alexis v. State, 211
So. 3d 81, 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (reversing the trial court's order imposing fees over the

&

statutory minimum without a hearing to contest the amount).
150. Hashimoto, supra note 11, at 1019, 1024; Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of
Self-Representation:An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423,
442 (2007) (noting that less than 0.5% of federal felony defendants represented themselves in
court).
151. Hashimoto, supra note 11, at 1024 (citing INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL
SOC. RESEARCH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF INMATES IN LOCAL JAILS

https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/4359/version/2).

(2002),
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represented by counsel.1 2 A study of Florida misdemeanor defendants
found that 66% appeared at arraignment without counsel, and only in a
third of those cases did the trial judge inform defendants of the
53
disadvantages of proceeding without an attorney.' Of more significance
to this article and study, most waived the right to counsel only after being
informed that they would have to pay $50 to file an application for a
public defender and an additional, minimum fee of $50 for
representation.1 54 Although informative, the Florida study did not
55
interview defendants to learn why they proceeded without counsel,1 or
said another way, the research did not "[l]isten[] in the right places [to]
hear the answers from criminal defendants themselves."15

IV.

EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF THE $50 APPLICATION FEE

Although some evidence suggests that misdemeanor defendants are
157 there is no direct
waiving counsel due to "prohibitively high fees,"
empirical data that supports the argument. Scholarly work has largely
relied on speculation and anecdotes rather than empirical data in
understanding waivers of counsel. Even the singular empirical exception
by Wright and Logan observed that relying on aggregated court statistics
58
added little to our understanding of the effect of application fees.1 This
study begins to explore that empirical void by conducting a semireplication of the Three-Minute Justice court observation study in Orange
County, Florida followed by interviews with defendants to listen to their
15 9
voices on the reason that they proceeded without counsel.
A. Three-Minute Justice
In 2010, undergraduate students collected information on the
60
processing of cases in misdemeanor courts in 21 Florida counties.'
After being instructed on the right to counsel in misdemeanor court
at 1024 (citing INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL

&

152. Hashimoto, supra note 11,

SOC. RESEARCH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF INMATES IN LOCAL JAILS (2002),
2

https://www.icpsr. umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/4359/version/ ).
153. SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 4, at 15.
154. SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 4, at 18.
155. SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 4, at 14.
156. Wright & Logan, supra note 6, at 2087.
157. See Hashimoto, supra note 11, at 1032; see, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines
Clause: Challengingthe Modern Debtors' Prison, 65 UCLA L. REv. 2, 5-6 (2018) (highlighting
the case of Larry Thompson, who was arrested in Orange County, Florida for failing to pay

mounting fines, fees, and costs associated with a traffic charge, which added more debt to an
individual who did not have a meaningful way to pay); see also Wright & Logan, supra note 6, at

2061.
158. Wright & Logan, supra note 6, at 2083.
159. SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 4.
160. SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 4, at 14.
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proceedings, students were provided a 16 page court observation
instrument to collect data on misdemeanor cases at arraignments.161 I
addition to due process measures, students collected information on
waivers of counsel and the announcement of the $50 application fee for
appointment of the public defender.1 62 They found that "[m]ost often
public defenders or trial judges at the beginning of arraignment
proceedings announced the costs associated with choosing public
counsel."1 63 Since Florida does not allow trial judges to waive the $50
application fee, the fee, along with any other representation costs, are
imposed on defendants "as special conditions of probation or reduced to
a lien on [defendants'] property."1 6 4 During this study, one observer
witnessed a courtroom where defendants were given a rights-waiver form
that included a standard assessment of $50 for a plea at arraignment and
$350 in assessments for public defender costs upon entry of a plea after
arraignment.1 65 In other words, defendants were penalized for entering a
not guilty plea after arraignment.1 66
As the focus of the study in Three-Minute Justice was not on the
impact of the application fee on defendants' right to counsel, the study
did not examine whether defendants who were notified about the fee were
more or less likely to seek public counsel. Moreover, the Three-Minute
Justice report was an observation-only study; defendants were not
interviewed about their decisions to proceed with or without counsel.1 67
Even without this insight, the findings were interesting. Few
defendants were in custody at the time of arraignment; most were
released on their own recognizance. 16 8 Most defendants were represented
at arraignment by a public defender (49.4%) followed by those who
represented themselves (37.4%) and private counsel (13.2%).169 In larger
counties, however, defendants were significantly more likely to proceed
without counsel, and in smaller counties, defendants were significantly
more likely to hire a private attorney (p<0.05). 170 Another interesting
finding from the study was that defendants who were represented by
counsel (public or private) were significantly more likely to enter not
guilty pleas at arraignment (p<0.05).171
161. SMITH &
162. SMITH &
163. SMITH &
164. SMITH &
165. SMITH &

MADDAN,

supra note 4, at 14.

MADDAN, supra note 4, at 18.

supra note 4, at 18.
at 18.
MADDAN, supra note 4, at 17.
166. SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 4, at 17.
MADDAN,

MADDAN, supra note 4,

167. SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 4, at 14.
168. SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 4, at 21.

169.
170.

SMITH & MADDAN,
SMITH & MADDAN,

supra note 4, at 21 t.2.
supra note 4, at 21 t.2.; A p-value of 0.05 or less shows that there is

some association among the variables.
171.

SMITH & MADDAN,

supranote 4, at 23 t.9.
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Orange County was one of the 21 counties included in the ThreeMinute Justice study.1 7 2 For this Article, the data from Orange County
was filtered from the larger study and analyzed.1 7 3 Of the 1,649 total cases
in the study, 66 were collected in Orange County, Florida (Orlando). The
majority (54.7%) of observed cases involved non-DUI driving crimes,
including driving with a suspended license, followed by possession of
marijuana or open container of alcohol or disorderly conduct (25.0%).
Property (9.4%), battery and assault (1.6%), and all other crimes (9.4%)
rounded out the remaining offenses. Most defendants (85.9%) were
charged with only a single crime and almost all defendants (97%) were
out of custody at their arraignments. Forty percent were out on bond, 31%
were released on their own recognizance, and 12.5% were released after
posting a cash bond. The remaining (10.9%) were out on other forms of
release, ranging from a notice to appear (4.7%) or a summons to appear

(6.2%).
Most (70.4%) defendants were represented by counsel, and all but one
of these defendants was represented by court-appointed (or public)
counsel. Nearly 30% represented themselves. Defendants were most
often advised of their rights via playing a video recording (76.6%) or a
written form (73.4%). Most defendants (76.6%) entered a plea of guilty
or no contest at arraignment. Defendants' arraignments in Orange County
were as quick as the state average with 84.4% of arraignments-from
advisement of charges, entering a plea and imposing a sentence-taking
three minutes or less. The most commonly imposed punishments were
fines and/or court costs. Nearly 63% were required to pay court costs and
58% were required to pay a fine. Jail was infrequently imposed with only
one person being sentenced to jail (time-served).
B. Replication in Orange County, Florida
Since 2007, until the most recently available data in June 2017, there
has been a steady decline in county criminal filings and dispositions in
the State of Florida. 7 4 Chart 1, County Criminal Filings and Dispositions
FY 2007-08 to FY 2016-17, reveals this trend.' 5 This pattern of
declining filings and dispositions affected Orange County, Florida as
well. In 2010-11, there were 48,354 misdemeanor, ordinance, driving
and driving-under-the-influence filings and by 2016-17 that incidence
172. SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 4, at 14.
173. The disaggregated data from the Three-Minute Justice study is on file with the author.
174. This Florida trend is consistent with the findings from recent research which found that
nationally, the number of misdemeanor arrests and filings have declined markedly over the last
twenty years. Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 25.
175. 2016-2017 was the most recent statistical data available from Florida. See Florida

Office of the State Courts Administrator, FY 2016-17 Florida Statistical Reference Guide, 7-1,
http://www.flcourts.org/core/fileparse.php/541 /urit/Chapter-7_County-Criminal.pdf
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rate had fallen to 30,834.176 In 2010-11, there were 45,314 dispositions
in Orange County,17 and in 2016-17, there were only 30,857
dispositions.1 78

Florida County Criminal Filings and Dispositions
FY 200708 to FY 2016-17
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To assess whether court processing had changed, two undergraduate
students, using the same court observation instrument that was used to
collect data for the Three-Minute Justice report, observed and collected
information on misdemeanor court proceedings in July 2018179 (i.e., eight
years later) in Orange County (Orlando), Florida. Before conducting their
court observations and data collection, students completed CITI 8 0
176. See id.
177. See Florida Office of the State Courts Administrator, FY 2010-11 Florida Statistical
Reference Guide, 7-1, https://www.flcourts.org/content/download/218418/1976454/Reference

Guide 10-11 -Ch7.pdf.
178. See Florida Office of the State Courts Administrator, FY 2016-17 Florida Statistical
Reference Guide, 7-1,

http://www.flcourts.org/core/fileparse.php/541/urlt/Chapter-7_County-

Criminal.pdf
179. Immediately before data collection, the elected state attorney in Orange County
implemented a new bail policy, which granted some non-violent misdemeanor release without
bond. See Press Release, ACLU of Fla., Florida Campaign for Criminal Justice Responds to Ninth
Judicial Circuit Bail Reform Announcement (May 16, 2018), https://www.aclufl.org/en/pressreleases/florida-campaign-criminal-justice-reform-responds-ninthjudicial-circuit-bail-reform.
180. The students successfully completed the social-behavioral-educational research course
offered through the CITI Program. This course introduces students to "regulatory and ethical
issues important to the conduct of research involving human subjects." CITI PROGRAM, SocialBehavioral-Educational (SBE) Basic, https://about.citiprogram.org/en/course/human-subjects-

research-2/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019).
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training to understand the importance and ethical limits of human
subjects' research. Later, they learned the basics of criminal procedure
and constitutional rights. They were also trained to efficiently use the
18
Three-Minute Justice observation instrument. 1
1. General observations
The observers collected information from only two court proceedings,
so this replication provides some baseline comparison, but the findings
are not generalizable. Bailiffs in both courtrooms gave defendants two
forms: (1) an Application for Criminal Indigent Status, and (2) a Plea of
Guilty or No Contest to a Criminal Charge in County Court form.
Defendants were advised to read and complete the forms. Even if they
wanted to waive counsel, or enter a not guilty plea, bailiffs explained that
filling out the forms in advance would save time. This is where the
similarities between these two court hearings diverged.
Court Room A. In the first courtroom, the bailiff explained some of
the rights to the group of defendants and he emphasized the importance
of the proceedings. In addition, a pre-recorded message by a judge was
played for defendants advising them of their constitutional rights. The
recording was dated, informing defendants that the application fee for
appointed counsel was $40, not $50. The fee was correctly identified,
however, on the application forms handed to defendants. The video was
played a second time in Spanish for the several Spanish-speaking
defendants in the courtroom. It appeared to the observers that few
defendants listened to the video, as they were advised to fill out their
forms while the video played.
A male assistant public defender spoke to the group before the trial
judge took the bench. He advised defendants of the purpose of the
arraignment proceedings, their rights, their options, and his availability
to represent them. He did not mention the fee. He explained that for some
charges, like driving under the influence, there would not be any offers
to enter a plea. The public defender advised the group that if they were
not citizens, the entry of a plea could result in deportation, and he advised
that they speak to an immigration lawyer and that the public defender's
office was available to assist. He expressed his willingness to speak with
defendants (without official appointment) before the trial judge took the
bench, and several defendants informally spoke with him about their
cases.
The trial judge, a female, then advised the group of their options,
cautioned them against discussing the facts of their cases, and reminded
them to complete the forms, even if they were not needed. The trial judge
called defendants up one at a time to discuss their cases. Overall, this
181. See

SMITH

&

MADDAN,

supra note 4.
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judge asked defendants questions and ensured that they understood the
proceedings. For one, non-English speaking defendant, the trial judge
took pains to ensure that he understood the proceedings and their
importance before accepting his plea. For another, the judge was
uncomfortable with the defendant entering a plea to a criminal charge,
and she asked the prosecutor to reduce the charge to a civil infraction,
which did occur. The trial judge did not emphasize the application fee or
cost associated with the appointment of counsel.
Court Room B. In the second courtroom, the bailiff did not advise
defendants of any of their rights, and no video recording was played to
explain the proceedings or the defendants' constitutional rights. The
female public defender told the group of defendants that they may already
be appointed a public defender. She explained their options at an
arraignment proceeding, which included the entry of a plea of not guilty,
guilty or no contest. She advised that many individuals qualified for
pretrial diversion. She informed the group that petit theft could be
enhanced to a felony on the third conviction. She also informed the group
that an adjudication, but not the withholding of adjudication, on a
marijuana charge would result in a one-year driver's license suspension..
Furthermore, she explained that the presiding judge was a "senior" judge
who was filling in that day and that, if the senior judge was unwilling to
offer to withhold adjudications, they should enter pleas of not guilty and
return to court because the assigned judge would withhold adjudication
on possession of marijuana charges.
Although "speed" and "timeliness" of the proceedings were
emphasized in both courtrooms, the female judge in the second
courtroom particularly stressed that the "fastest way to get you out of here
is to complete the forms and be ready when your name is called." This
judge interacted with individual defendants, but she did not ensure that
defendants understood the importance of the proceedings, or their right
to counsel. In most instances, she mentioned counsel after the defendants
expressed a desire to enter a plea, and then apparently as an afterthought
she stated, "you know you have the right to an attorney."
For the first case in this second courtroom, which was a city ordinance
violation, the trial judge mistakenly thought the charge was not criminal,
so when the defendant said he wanted to talk to an attorney, the trial judge
told him that he was not entitled to a public defender. The defendant was
homeless, and the prosecutor reduced the charge to a civil infraction with
a fine of $230. The judge accepted the defendant's plea, but she did not
advise him of any other rights. In accepting his plea, she noted only that
he appeared alert and intelligent. Despite being homeless, the defendant
said that he could pay the $230 fine within sixty days.
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2. Observational data
For this preliminary replication of the Three Minute Justice study, the
two judges were white females and 29 total cases were observed.
Although the sample size is small, the 29 observed cases revealed few
improvements in the processing of cases since 2010, and at least with
regard to the appointment of counsel, due process worsened.
While in 2010, 54.7% of defendants were charged with non-DUI
(driving under the influence) driving crimes (including driving with a
suspended license), in 2018, 41.2% (n=12) of processed and resolved
cases were non-DUI driving crimes, ranging from driving with a
suspended license and reckless driving to driving without a proper tag.
Neither trial judge in the 2018 hearings accepted a plea at arraignment
when defendants were charged with DUI. The short- and long-term
8 2 and the trial
consequences for a DUI conviction are steep in Florida,
judges provided defendants the opportunity to hire counsel or consult
with appointed counsel. Again, similar to 2010, the next most common
serious charge in this 2018 replication was possession of marijuana
(20.7%, n=6), followed by petit theft (6.9%, n=2), resisting an officer
without violence (6.9%, n=2), violation of probation (6.9%, n=2),
alcohol-related offenses (6.9%, n=2), and battery and assault (3.4% n=1).
Most defendants were charged with only a single crime (58.6%, n=16.9),
but far fewer than in 2010 (85%), and all defendants were out of custody
at their arraignments.' 8 3
One of the starkest differences between the two samples concerned
representation by counsel. In 2010, most (70.4%) of defendants were
represented by counsel in Orange County. In 2018, few (17.2%, n=5)
were represented by counsel. Two were represented by private counsel,
and three others were represented by the public defender. Over 80%
(n=24) represented themselves. All defendants were provided a written
waiver of rights in 2018, and as mentioned above, defendants in one
courtroom heard a video-recorded message from a judge advising them
of their options and rights.
In this 2018 study, all defendants were handed an application for the
appointment of the public defender upon entry into the courtroom. The
application advised defendants that there was a fee associated with
applying for counsel and it required defendants to complete an affidavit
which inquired about the number of their dependents, their take-home
income, and any other income, including social security or
unemployment benefits. Defendants were asked to list their total
182. Florida Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Florida DUI and Administrative
Suspension Laws, https://www.flhsmv.gov/driver-licenses-id-cards/education-courses/dui-and-

iid/florida-dui-administrative-suspension-laws/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2019).
183. The bond information was not available for the defendants in 2018.
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liabilities and debts and answer three questions about receiving
temporary or permanent government assistance. Finally, defendants were
asked if they posted bond or if the bond was posted by someone else.
During individual interactions with the trial judges in 2018, few
defendants were advised of their right to counsel (37.9%, n=11)), asked
if they wanted to hire counsel (31.0%, n=9), asked if they wanted counsel
(55.2%, n=16), or asked if they could afford counsel (58.6%, n=17).
Fewer defendants (34.5%, n=10) were advised of the importance of an
attorney, the benefits of counsel (13.8%, n=4), and the disadvantages of
proceeding without counsel (13.8%, n=4).
Similar to 2010, most defendants (65.5%, n=19) in 2018 entered a plea
of guilty or no contest at arraignment. In accepting the plea, the trial
judges most often determined whether the plea was voluntary (73.9%,
n=21) and if they understood that they were giving up their right to trial
(69.6%, n=20). But, many defendants were not advised of those rights. In
2018, fewer were advised that by entering a plea they were giving up their
right to an attorney (52.4%, n=15), the right to cross examination (27.8%,
n=8), the right to present a defense (23.5%, n=7), and the right to have
the state prove the case against them (18.8%, n=5). Few defendants
(4.2%, n=1) were advised of their right to an appeal or that deportation
was a possible consequence of entering their plea (34.8%, n=10).
No defendant was sentenced to jail. In 2018, most defendants were
fined (37.9%, n=11) and/or charged costs (37.9%, n=11). The remainder
of defendants were given a pretrial diversion option. The total costs
and/or fines ranged from $147 to $700. Only one individual was
sentenced to probation.
In 2010, 85% of defendants' cases were resolved-from advisement
of charges, entering a plea, and imposing a sentence in three minutes or"
less. In 2018, judges were a bit slower, but arraignments remained quick
for (65.2%, n=18) of defendants whose cases were completed in three or
fewer minutes. See Table 1, 2010-2018 Comparison of In-Court
Observations.
Table 1 2010-2018 Comparison of In-Court Observations
2010 (n=64)
2018 (n=29)
Percent Represented by Counsel
_
70.4%
17.2%
Video-Informed of Rights
76.6%
50.0%
Written Rights Form
73.4%
100.0%
Plea of Guilty and No Contest
76.6%
65.5%
Sanction Fine and/or Costs
63.0%
56.0%
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4
C. Defendant Interviews18

In 2010, defendants were not interviewed about their decision to
waive counsel.' 8 5 In 2018, none of the 29 total defendants were
interviewed following the above-described and observed court
proceedings. Court observers returned to later court proceedings on
several different days, observed the proceedings to identify defendants,
and interviewed them.
The defendant interviews were focused on the reasons that defendants
waived counsel and assessing whether the application fee chilled the
assertion of their right to appointed counsel. In these later court
proceedings, defendants were handed the same application and affidavit
form for the appointment of counsel-as described above-as they
entered court. In some courtrooms the video-recorded rights were played,
and in others, bailiffs and/or the assistant public defenders advised
defendants generally about the court proceeding and their rights.
Observers interviewed only those defendants who were sentenced
after entering guilty or no contest pleas and waiving counsel. They
followed those defendants out of the courtroom and into the hallway,
outside the hearing of the proceedings, other defendants, and court
personnel. Each defendant was asked if they would be willing to answer
a few questions, taking no longer than five to ten minutes. The observers
explained that they were not associated with the courts, but a local
university working on a research project. Interviewers assured the
defendants of anonymity and explained that the interview was voluntary.
Consistent with observations of defendants who were summoned to
arraignment, the vast majority of interviewed defendants were black or
Hispanic. None were white/Caucasian. Of the fourteen interviewed
defendants, eight were Hispanic (three females, five males), and six
black/African American (one female, five males). The most common
charges of those interviewed were possession of marijuana and petit theft.
Between five and ten defendants declined to participate.
After interviewing the first 11 defendants, the observers and authors
reviewed the transcribed responses and noted prominent themes. Many
defendants waived counsel because they did not perceive a "need" for a
lawyer, most understood that they had a right to counsel, but some did
not know about the application fee, despite each defendant being handed
an "Application for Criminal Indigent Status" form upon entry into court.
184. IRB approved this research as part of a larger project that included interviewing
defendants about their reasons for waiving counsel.
185. There were ten county-criminal judges assigned in Orange County, Florida in 2018.
Observers interviewed defendants who appeared before five different judges at arraignment
hearings. Judges in Orange County rotate presiding over arraignment hearings, so it was not
possible to interview defendants who appear before all judges in the narrow time frame (Summer

2018) of data collection.
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Given these themes, the remaining three interviewed defendants were
asked additional, clarifying questions. The entire script, the initial
interview questionnaire, and the additional clarifying questions are found
in Appendix 1.
Introductory questions determined whether defendants were aware of
the outcome of their case (the entry of their plea, adjudication, and
sentence). A second set of questions focused on their waivers of counsel,
including most importantly why they waived counsel. A third group of
questions focused on their knowledge of the court system and their case,
particularly, their knowledge about the possible consequences associated
with entering a plea and their satisfaction with the court and court
personnel.
The clarifying questions, which were asked of only three defendants,
focused on why they thought that they did not need a lawyer, and if they
thought there were advantages of proceeding with a lawyer, or
disadvantages of proceeding without one. If they knew about the
application fee, defendants were asked if they knew what the fee was for,
if it affected their decision about accepting an appointed lawyer, and if
they could afford the fee. Those who were unaware of the fee were asked
if they read the forms that were given to them in court and if knowing
about the fee would that have affected their decision about being
appointed a lawyer. Finally, the remaining defendants were asked if they
were aware of any potential consequences or problems that might result
from entering their plea; for example, with employment, housing, or
licensing.
The primary hypothesis tested by this preliminary research was that
defendants may waive counsel due to the chilling effect of the application
fee, that the cost would dissuade poor defendants from using a lawyer.
To fully understand defendants' decisions, explicit themes' 86 and
concepts1 87 that naturally emerged in coding the defendants' answers
were identified regarding their understanding of the proceedings, their
right to counsel, the application fee and potential consequences of
entering a plea, their reasons for waiving counsel, and their satisfaction
with the court.1 88 The themes and concepts that materialized are discussed
in detail below.1 8 9
186. Themes are sentences or words that are counted as a unit. BRUCE L. BERG, QUALITATIVE
(4th ed. 2001).

RESEARCH METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 246-47

187. Concepts are counted units that are more "sophisticated type of word counting[.]" /d.
188. Defendants' answers were coded using their literal terms, called in vivo coding by A.L.
Strauss. See ANSELM

L.

STRAUSS, QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

58 (1987).

189. The interviews were semi-structured, meaning that they generally followed the same
format, but interviewers were able to ask clarifying or follow-up questions when appropriate to
understand the defendants' answers. The primary researcher and two interviewers coded each of
the defendant's answers to identify patterns. Unlike other textual or content analysis, the coding
of the defendants' answers was not controversial or subject to much interpretation. Despite the

88
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1. The results-oriented focus of defendants
As with the two trial judges, defendants focused on resolving their
cases quickly and at that moment with little or no attention to potential,
future consequences from their day in court. Two defendants did not
know the maximum punishment that they faced from the charges; an
additional defendant reported that the trial judge informed him of the
general "consequences" of entering a plea, but he did not elaborate on
those consequences. A fourth defendant presumed that jail and
background checks were a potential consequence. The remaining
defendants were unaware of any other consequences of entering their
pleas:
Interviewee #1: "When I was sitting down I was thinking
about my current job and I'm only 20, so I'm not going to
have a real career at the moment. I'm still in college, but my
current job, I wonder if they're going to send this to them or
my job and then my job and talk to me about that but if they
do, I like where I work, but if they fire me, I guess I don't
want to work there anyway. [Defendant didn't understand
the difference between adjudication and withholding
adjudication] I always thought adjudication was like a slap
on the wrist or you come back and you have this timeframe
and you serve or money to pay or drug tests, or time to be
wasted. I didn't want to go down the route where I had to
stop smoking for months at a time or let alone more than one.
[Is that why you didn't take the pretrial diversion] Yeah, I
probably should have asked about pretrial diversion and the
no contest for the pretrial diversion and see about
community service with them, but what's the whole point of
me being here in the first place. We have to redefine what
guilty means then."
Interviewee #2: "But, I'm grateful for what I did get
because when the situation happened, I could get a
suspended license."
Interviewee #3: "No [Judge didn't tell him of any
consequences]."
Interviewee #7: "No... He didn't say anything other than
the jail time and the maximum amount offines."
Interviewee #8: "No ma'am he just gave us that straight
up."
straightforward nature of the defendants' answers, we compared our individual coding of the
answers to ensure intercoder reliability. We also used two-dimensionality to describe the

defendants with their gendered and racial appearance.
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Interviewee #9: "Ma'am I really don't know. It was just
so quick."
Interviewee #10: "He did, but I really wasn't paying
attention. I was just happy."
The defendants approached the conclusion of their cases in a resultsoriented manner, focusing on the immediacy of the sanction, which was
in every case. a fine (except for Interviewee #1, who negotiated
community service to replace his fine). When asked if they knew their
sanction and how their case resolved, defendants responded with some of
the following answers:
Interviewee #1: "Yes, to probation officer to sign up for
community service."

Interviewee #2: "Basically, withheld the cannabis and
gave me the paraphernalia charge. Dismissed the cannabis
and withheld the paraphernalia, and gave me a $273 fine."
Interviewee #4: "Ihad to pay $273."
Interviewee #6: "I don't know I just think the costs of
everything afterwards is kinda outrageous... Almost $400
so. . .for petty theft of a box of chicken."
Interviewee #10: "Ended pretty good. No contest, I don't
really know really [know the original charge, I guess]
resisting the arrest of an officer. I just have to write an
apology letter. [No fine?] I did, but I'm from out of state, so
my bondpaidfor it."
Interviewee #1: "It ended in uh, just me payingfines, no
contest to possession of cannabis."
Interviewee # 10 downplayed the payment of his fine; the
trial judge took his cash bond as payment. Overall,
defendants focused on the immediate penalty, overlooking
or not understanding the potential for future consequences of
entering a plea.
2. The Indirect "Chill" of the Application Fee
All of the defendants understood either that they had the right to
counsel or the right to court-appointed counsel, however, four indicated
that they were not offered counsel. Despite knowing that they had the
right to counsel, each interviewed defendant proceeded without counsel.
Few defendants directly mentioned the $50 application fee or the costs
associated with appointed counsel as the reason for waiving counsel.
Eight were unaware of the fee, even though in every courtroom,

90

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 30

defendants were handed the "Application for Criminal Indigent Status"
form, which advised defendants of the $50 application fee and defendants
completed along with their financial information. Two of the three
defendants who were asked clarifying questions indicated that they were
not informed by the judge of the fee, but one stated that he had read about
the fee in his paperwork.
One defendant expressly and directly identified the fee as a factor in
his decision to waive counsel:
Interviewee #9: "Yes, I believe 50 dollars, I believe. [Did
it factor into your decision?] Yes, it did. If I'm getting a
public defender that means I don't have the money to afford
it."
An additional defendant, stated that the $50 application fee factored
into his decision not to get an attorney:
Interviewee #12: "The money situation, yeah."
A general inability to afford counsel was the reason given by two other
defendants:
Interviewee #4: "I can't afford one and I didn't really think I
would need one today."
Interviewee #9: "Because I lost my job due to this and I don't
have money."
The majority of defendants, however, asserted that they waived
counsel because they did not think that they needed a lawyer or
downplayed the seriousness of the charges, claiming that they were able
to represent themselves:
Interviewee #3: "Because it is a little situation so I could've
just done it by myself"
Interviewee #4: "Because I figured it was something petty so
I don't need it."
Interviewee #6: "I just feel like I didn't really need one. I
understand what the charges and everything [sic] but I just
feel like I didn't really need one for something so small."
Interviewee #7: "It was my first offense, so I don't think I
needed one."
Interviewee #8: "I didn't really... It didn't say that I needed
one."
Interviewee #10: "I really didn't need one."

THE COST OF (IN)JUSTICE

2019]

91

Interviewee #11: "I was ready for a public defender
depending on the outcome, but I just wanted to try it on my
own."

This also was true of the three defendants who were asked clarifying
questions. Each stated that they did not need a lawyer. When they were
asked why and whether a lawyer would have helped, the three defendants
did not perceive the criminal charges as serious and saw no reason to get
a lawyer:
Interviewee #12: "I feel like I didn't need one. [Why?] It was
a misdemeanor. [Would a lawyer have helped? Advantages
if you had a lawyer?] No because I was red handed, so
there's no point... even a lawyer couldn't get me off. [Did
you not want to waste the money on it?] Yeah."
Interviewee #13: "Because I thought it wasn't needed
really... it was a petty charge. Yeah I just felt like it wasn't
needed. It was nothing really major. [Any advantages or
disadvantages to having or not having an attorney?] Not with
this case."
Interviewee #14: "I didn't see a reason to. [Do you know any
advantages or disadvantages to having an attorney?] Not for
possession of cannabis... not really."
3. Perceptions of Fairness
Defendants' perceptions on the fairness of the proceedings and judge
were mixed. For those that were not satisfied, they concentrated on the
belief that possession of marijuana should not be criminalized and were
frustrated by the judges' inability to dismiss the charges:
Interviewee #1: "No. I would prefer not to have been
arrested and wasted everyone's time.. . . I would prefer it
would be nothing, because we treat alcohol the same way. I
mean like an open container would make sense, but for
marijuana and open container doesn't really make sense. No,
I thought [the judge] would be able to just completely drop
charges, just completely in general, just due to that,
especially because of the state that we are in, so I never knew
that they're going to charge me. I don't want to pay any
money whatsoever towards something like this."
Interviewee #2: "I don't think marijuanashould be illegal,
to me when it comes to that, I don't think it was handled
fairly. But, I'm grateful for what I did get because when the
situation happened, I could get a suspended license. He was
getting ready to take me in, but he started listening to me and
I'm a veteran and this is why I smoke the marijuana, and this
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is the reason that I smoke the marijuana, there is no intent to
sell on my record."
The satisfied defendants focused on their immediate, and again
results-oriented, perceptions of fairness. They perceived the court as fair
and they were satisfied because other defendants received the same
sanction, a fine:
Interviewee #4: "Yes. It was my first offense and I've never
done anything like this before. It was under 20 grams, so I
think it was pretty reasonablejust to pay the fine."
Interviewee #5: "Yes. From what I heard everybody got the
same thing... on my case everybody got the same."
Interviewee #7: "Yeah, but he [co-defendant] doesn't. His
was just more expensive. We did the exact same thing we
were together. [In this instance, the trial judge imposed a
larger fine on the male co-defendant than the female
codefendant; she thought the fine was fair, and he did not
due to the inequity]."
Interviewee #11: "Yeah for the most part because the charge.
[sic] What it is related to is something that is still illegal, so
I mean it is going to be treated like any other illegal drug. So
I meanfor the outcome I think it'sfair."
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Although this is a preliminary study with a small sample size, the
findings begin to shed light on the growing problem of unrepresented
defendants in misdemeanor courts and the reasons that they waive
counsel. Advocates advance that application or registration fees chill
access to counsel, and this research lends some support to their argument,
but it does so indirectly.
First, and glaringly, the percentage of defendants who were
unrepresented in 2018 grew substantially as compared to 2010. Given
that there has been a steady decline in the overall filing and disposition
of misdemeanor cases (see Table 1),190 the increase in defendants
proceeding without counsel is alarming, and in the opposite direction of
the recommendation by the Three-Minute Justice report on Florida's

190. See Florida Office of the State Courts Administrator, FY 2016-17 Florida Statistical
4
Reference Guide, 7-1, http://www.flcourts.org/core/fileparse.php/5 1/urit/Chapter-7_County-

Criminal.pdf.
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misdemeanor courts.' 91 The reason for fewer and fewer defendants
benefiting from counsel was the primary question under study.1 9 2
Defendants were aware of their right to counsel, but they proceeded
without counsel, entering pleas and resolving their cases. The
overarching focus seemed to be on expediency and efficiency, getting
cases revolved quickly and moving on. Defendants' short-sighted,
results-oriented approach was reinforced by trial judges. Trial judges
emphasized the quickness of the proceedings. They did not adequately
advise defendants of their rights, nor were they advised of the advantages
of using a lawyer or the disadvantages of proceeding without one. This
lack of advisement from trial judges is significant; it undermines the
gravity of the offenses. Without proper advisement, defendants are left
with the incorrect presumption that legal counsel is dispensable.
Defendants were handed plea and indigency forms. They were
advised to fill out the forms whether they would be used, or not. Trial
judges advised defendants that those with uncompleted forms would be
moved to the end of the docket. Focusing on the quickest way to get out
of court likely impresses upon defendants that misdemeanor cases are'
unimportant and encourage them to focus on resolving their cases
quickly. This may explain why defendants likewise focused on an
expedient outcome, rather than appreciating the possible short- and longterm consequences of their pleas. During interviews, some defendants
admitted that they did not pay attention to the judge or advisements, but
were simply happy to leave with only a fine.
Defense lawyers and public defenders tend to slow down the pace of
proceedings, focusing on defendants' rights and due process.1 9 3 Every
defendant reported that they knew about their right to counsel, but most
presumed that they did not need one. A few defendants expressly
identified their inability to pay the application fee as a reason for waiving
counsel. Obviously, for these defendants, the fee posed a direct chilling
effect on the assertion of their right to counsel.
Most defendants explained that they did not "need" a lawyer or
implied that they did not need one because the charge was minor. The
three defendants, who were asked clarifying questions, directly
connected the perceptions of need and insignificance. Even without
191. See SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 4, at 20.
192. Another striking pattern was that most defendants summoned and appearing at
arraignments were Hispanic or black/African-American. Although the lack of diversity among
those hauled into court for minor crimes was not the focus of this particular research, it has been
the focus of a number of others. See NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM
AND INJUSTICE [N AMERICA'S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 9 (2016). The reason for this stark
contrast should be studied further.
193. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 27 (1979); Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the CriminalProcess, 113
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14 (1964).
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directly stating that the fee influenced their decision, the other
defendants' reasons reflect a balancing of economies. In deciding that
they did not need a lawyer, defendants tacitly asserted that lawyers were
not worth the cost. Since there was a cost, or a presumed cost as some
defendants noted, they balanced whether it was worth the money to pay
for an attorney with the risk of representing themselves. Balancing costs
in everyday life poses different risks than those associated with the
decision to represent oneself in court. When deciding whether to hire a
lawn service, the balance is one of time and effort against money. It is not
that most people cannot mow their own lawns, they simply don't want to.
Handling one's own criminal court case, however, involves much greater
complexity, with potentially severe long-term consequences that are
absent from other mundane decisions.
The interviewed defendants did not fully appreciate the potential longterm consequences associated with entering misdemeanor pleas and trial
judges did not inform them of any of those consequences. Defendants
were left with the misperception that their misdemeanor charges were
minor.1 94 These criminal offenses were not civil traffic crimes and many
95
were punishable by up to one year in jail.1 Some crimes, such as petit
theft and driving under the influence, may be prosecuted as felonies upon
a third offense.1 96 Misdemeanor convictions can carry significant
collateral consequences. These include the loss of driving privileges,
removal from public housing, reduced educational and employment
and potential
licenses,
professional
revoked
opportunities,
19 7
deportations.
Scholars have noted the increasing fees and costs passed on to
defendants' 9 8 and the immediate and long-term consequences of
misdemeanor adjudications.1 99 Future research should focus on the
indirect connections between the chilling effect of fees, the lack of
194. See How Even Misdemeanor Violations Can Have Lasting Consequences on Job
Prospects, PBS NEwsHOUR (July 5, 2015, 1:53 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/evenAlexandra Natapoff, Why
misdemeanor-violations-can-lasting-consequences-job-prospects;
AM), http://www.slate.com/
11:33
Misdemeanors Aren't So Minor, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2012,
articles/news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/2012/04/misdemeanors_canhave major-consequence
s_forthe peoplecharged_.html; BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 58, at 12-13.

195. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.

§ 775.08(2) (2018).

196. In Florida, for example, defendants charged with their third petit theft or DUI may be
prosecuted for a third-degree felony, which carries a punishment of up to five years in prison. See

FLA. STAT.

§§ 812.014(3)(c), 316.193(2)(b) (2018).

197. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 58, at 12, 28, 34; Brian M. Murray, Beyond the Right

to Counsel: Increasing Notice of Collateral Consequences, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139, 1141, 1154
(2015); Natapoff, supra note 25, at 1325-26; Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 11 ANN. REV.
L. & Soc. Sci. 255, 261-62 (2015).
198. DILLER, supra note 107, at 1, 5-6.
199. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 58, at 12-13; Murray, supra note 197, at 1143-44;
Natapoff, supra note 25, at 1316-17.
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adequate advisement of rights and consequences, and defendants'
decisions to waive counsel. In the present study, a few defendants
expressly waived counsel because they could not afford it. Other
intimated the balancing of economies, deciding that they did not need a
lawyer. One defendant observed that fees and fines for his own charges
had noticeably increased. Interviewee #3 stated: "Well back then it was
my first charge, back in 2013. So, I was eligible [for] pretrial diversion.
Now this one is my second one so I'm not eligible to do it. From 2013 to
now, yeah. In 2013 there were barely any fines."
Without defense lawyers involved in misdemeanor cases, oversight
often falls short in the misdemeanor courts, and there is limited assurance
that defendants are adequately informed. Prosecutors and judges may
ensure that there are no egregious constitutional violations, but they rely
on minimal information from police reports. Defendants tend to focus on
factual, rather than legal guilt. Challenges to the admissibility of
evidence, ensuring the constitutionality of searches and seizures, and
confirming the sufficiency of evidence have been truncated in these
courts because of the absence of defense lawyers. As noted before,
defense lawyers do indeed slow down the process of justice, but for the
good reason of ensuring fairness and due process. 2 00 Most defendants,
even those charged with misdemeanor offenses, "need" lawyers, whether
they realize it or not. Society and the judiciary likewise need defense
lawyers to guarantee integrity of the courts.
Going forward, more research should be dedicated to understanding
why defendants waive their constitutional right to counsel, continuing to
examine whether the crush of mounting fees, including application fees,
chills the assertion of the right to counsel and if trial judges are
inadvertently sending defendants the wrong message that misdemeanor
crimes are unimportant and lawyers are unnecessary. Additionally,
research should explore whether adequately informed defendants-those
told about the disadvantages of proceeding without counsel and the
potential for short-term and long-term consequences of entering pleas to
misdemeanor charges-might make different decisions, including taking
advantage of their right to counsel, or at a minimum consulting counsel
in court. Moreover, well-informed defendants might be more likely to
consult counsel, or perceive the need for counsel, if that counsel is
actually free.

200. See FEELEY, supra note 193, at 27; see Packer, supra note 193, at 14.
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Appendix 1
with University of Central
Script: Hello, my name is
Florida, and I am working on a research project. We are trying to evaluate
due process, the right to counsel in misdemeanor courts, the reasons that
individuals waive their rights, and their satisfaction with the court
process.
We would like to ask you questions about your court experience - it
should take only 5-10 minutes. To be able to look over the results later,
we need to audio tape the interview. After we transcribe the interview,
we will not link your name to your statement and we will destroy the
audio file. We will not share your name with anyone. We hope to write
articles or reports about the court process. We won't use your name and
we won't identify you in articles or reports. We'll use what you say to
write the report.
We are not working for anyone in the court system. You do not have
to talk to us at all. This is completely voluntary. We would like to know
about your experience, but there is no benefit to you or your case. If you
agree to answer questions and change your mind that is perfectly okay.
Just tell us you don't want to answer our questions, or simply walk away.
You can ask us whatever questions that you like before you decide.
Would you be willing to answer a few questions and be recorded?
Case Questions:
Was your case finished today? How did it end? How did you plead?
To what charges? What was your sentence? Were you convicted
(adjudicated), or not?
Questions about Waiving Counsel
1. Why didn't you have an attorney?
2. Were you offered an attorney?
3. Were you advised that you had the right to an attorney?
4. Did you know that you could get a court-appointed attorney?
5. Were you told about an application fee? If so, do you know how
much the fee was? Did that factor into your decision about getting a
court-appointed attorney?
6. Have you ever used an attorney before?
a. If yes, do you think having an attorney made a difference?
b. If yes before, why not now?
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Knowledge about Case/Courts
1. Have you come to court before? If yes, was this time in court
different?
2. Do you know the maximum punishment or sentence for the
misdemeanor that you were charged with?
3. Did the judge tell you about any other consequences from pleading
guilty/being found guilty today? Do you know of any other
consequences?
Court Satisfaction
Were you treated fairly by the Judge?
Prosecutor?
Court Deputy?
Do you think the outcome was fair? Why, or why not?
Do you feel like you understood your rights, and the rights that you
gave up? For example, the right to a trial.
Additional Clarifying Questions 20 1
1. Defendants who state that they didn't think they needed a lawyer:
a. Why, do you think that you didn't need a lawyer?
b. What do you think a lawyer would or would not do?
c. Do you think that there might be advantages of proceeding with
a lawyer, or disadvantages of proceeding without one?
2. If the defendants knew about the application fee:
a. Do you know what the fee was for?
b. Did the fee affect decision about getting appointed a lawyer?
c. Could you afford the fee?
3. If the defendant was unaware of the fee:
a. Did you read the forms that were given out in court?
b. If about the fee would the fee have affected your decision to
proceed without counsel?
4. Are you aware of any potential consequences or problems that
might result from entering your plea? For example, any effect on your
employment, housing or licensing?

201. Additional questions that were not asked should focus on the difference it might make
if defendants were actually offered counsel:
a. Would an "offer" of an attorney make a difference?
b. If an attorney was available in court, would you have, at least, spoken to an
attorney, even briefly?

